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Abstract. This short essay shows why the customary two-categories of punishment 
theories (retributive theories and consequentialist theories) should be increased 
to three to include a-normative theory and how that would aid understanding of 
differences in punishment thinking and policy over time and across space. Section I 
lays out conventional typologies of punishment theories and explains why a-normative 
theory should be added. Section II introduces the general literature on determinants 
of punishment policies and practices. Section III briefly discusses Eastern and Central 
Europe. Section IV illustrates how the normative and explanatory theories when 
combined enrich explanations and improve understanding. 
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Understanding of punishment policies and practices in a single country 
or generally can be enriched by looking across disciplinary boundaries and 
by combining ideas and arguments from disciplines that are usually kept 
separate. Most of the modern literature on the determinants of penal policy 
is written by social scientists and generally focuses on a single country (e.g., 
Garland 2001; Pratt and Clark 2005; Simon 2006; Lacey 2008; Tonry 2009). A 
few works offer generalisations about many countries (Cavadino and Dignan 
2006; Tonry 2007; Lappi-Seppälä 2008; Nelken 2010; Snacken and Dumortier 
2011). Such work is informative as far as it goes, but it could go further if it 
took better note of writings by philosophers and historians. 
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The ways people think and talk about punishment vary between places 
and over time and inexorably influence punishment discourses and practices. 
The development of indeterminate sentencing in the United States and of 
“measures” (as distinct from punishments; de Keijser 2011) in much of the 
Western Europe in the early decades of the twentieth century, for example, 
were products of positivist ways of thinking that were influential among 
academic and policy elites on both continents (Pifferi 2011). 
Policies and practices could be better linked to changing ideas if resort 
more often were made to work in other disciplines. Writings by philosophers 
and legal theorists on normative justifications of punishment almost always 
categorize punishment ideas and arguments under the two headings 
“retributivism” (sometimes deontology) and “consequentialism” (sometimes 
teleology and in earlier times usually “utilitarianism” or “positivism”) (e.g., 
von Hirsch, Ashworth, and Roberts 2009; Tonry 2011b). Support for those 
two ways of thinking varies with time and space. Policies and practices vary 
with them. Writings by historians document wide changes over time in 
prevailing ways of thinking about the purposes and functions of sentencing 
and punishment (e.g., Rothman 1971; Tonry 2011a). 
When the literatures on normative punishment theory, determinants of 
penal policies, and the history of punishment institutions and practices are 
combined, a number of usually invisible relationships leap out. Here, for 
illustration, are two. 
Firstly, the customary partitioning of normative ideas about punishment 
between retributivist and consequentialist perspectives is insufficient. They 
provide frameworks for discussing and proposing what may justly be done 
to people who have been convicted of crimes but they are fundamentally 
incomplete. They do not and are unable to encompass ways of thinking about 
punishment in which just or appropriate treatment of individual offenders is 
not a consideration at all. 
These might be called a-normative theories. They are influential in many 
countries in our time, particularly in the United States, England and Wales, and 
parts of Eastern Europe. They were prevalent in South Africa during Apartheid 
and in the Soviet Union, and continue to cast long shadows in both. They were 
predominant in the Western countries before the nineteenth century as is 
demonstrated by Foucault’s (1977) accounts of punishment under the ancien 
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regime and historians’ accounts of the use of capital punishment in England 
(e.g., Thompson 1975; Hay et al. 1976) and imprisonment throughout Europe 
and Britain in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries (Whitman 2003).
The two customary ways of thinking about punishment focus fully or 
partly on offenders. Retributive theories link notions of blameworthiness, 
culpability, or wrongfulness to what happens to offenders. Consequentialist 
theories, although by definition concerned with effects, usually impose limits 
on what may justly be done to offenders: for example, that the expected 
amount of harm done to punished offenders does not exceed the harm 
thereby averted for others (Frase 2009). A-normative ways of thinking about 
punishment take no or reduced account of considerations relating to just 
treatment of offenders (e.g., Garland 2001; Tonry 2004; Simon 2006). That is 
the only way that extraordinarily disproportionate punishments—life without 
possibility of parole for 13-year-old robbers or three-strikes sentences of 
25-years-to-life for adult shoplifters in the United States, or indeterminate, 
potentially life-time imprisonment of “dangerous” offenders in England and 
Wales—can be understood. Likewise, it is the only plausible explanation for 
the exemplary use of pretrial confinement and the increased punishments 
imposed on offenders involved in England’s urban riots of 2011 (e.g., Lewis 
2011; The Guardian and LSE 2011). Normative considerations are not absent 
from these policies and practices, but the norms involved have little or nothing 
to do with justice toward offenders. They center instead on denunciation of 
wrongdoing, provision of reassurance to citizens, acknowledgment of popular 
senses of outrage and insecurity, and demonstration of government resolve. 
All of these goals, or functions, involve communication about norms related 
to wrongdoing, but none of them is principally concerned with offenders and 
their circumstances or interests. There are thus three, not two major normative 
frameworks for thinking about punishment practices, policies, and decisions. 
Secondly, historical and cultural contingencies have much more powerful 
influence than is ordinarily recognised. A number of sub-literatures on the 
determinants of penal policies demonstrate the influence of structural features 
of countries’ legal and social systems and of distinctive cultural and historical 
characteristics (e.g., Tonry 2007, 2009; Lappi-Seppälä 2008). These are no 
doubt important, but so is serendipity—exemplified by Michel Pifferi’s 2011 
writing on the widely different influence of positivist criminological ideas on 
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American and European legal systems in the opening decades of the twentieth 
century. 
In America, the result was indeterminate sentencing that led to near aban-
donment of retributivist thinking and concerns for proportionality as a con-
sideration in dealing with most offenders, and shaped justice system institu-
tions and practices that survive today. In continental Europe, the result was 
creation of the distinction between sanctions and measures, with measures 
reserved mostly for a small number of “dangerous” offenders. Fundamental 
ideas about proportionality and the Rechtsstaat, the “equality principle,” con-
tinued to strongly influence the punishments most offenders received, but had 
little or no salience for the measures reserved for the “dangerous.”
Those two ideas—a-normative punishment thinking and the effects of 
contingency—largely explain why imprisonment rates were so high and 
sentencing practices so severe in the USSR and remain severe in Russia 
(enemies of the people and social parasites’ interests deserve no consideration) 
and South Africa (the interests of “Kaffirs” don’t matter) and why some 
countries in Eastern Europe—still staggering under the legacies and cynicism 
of the communist period — are having a hard time achieving policies more 
like those in the rest of Europe. The two ideas also explain why America’s 
imprisonment rate was 5 times higher in 2012 than in 1973 and why it was the 
world’s highest by a wide margin in 2012. American adoption of indeterminate 
sentencing for most imprisoned offenders meant that long nominal prison 
sentences—5, 10, 20 years, life — became common. As a practical matter 
they were largely symbolic; parole boards set release dates for most prisoners 
after they had served small fractions of their nominal sentences. However, 
when a-normative thinking emerged as a potent influence in the 1980s, the 
policies that resulted were phrased in terms of the prevailing nominal coinage 
for prison terms. Ten- or twenty-year sentences in the 1950s or 1960s often 
meant as little as one year in prison and seldom more than a few years. Those 
formerly nominal numbers were converted in recent decades into ten- and 
twenty-year sentences that many offenders actually served, moderated only 
by small reductions for good behavior (for serious offenses in many states, 
typically only 15 percent of the sentence).
This short essay shows why the customary two-categories of punishment 
theories should be increased to three to include a-normative theory and how 
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that would aid understanding of differences in punishment thinking and 
policy over time and across space. Section I lays out conventional typologies of 
punishment theories and explains why a-normative theory should be added. 
Section II introduces the general literature on determinants of punishment 
policies and practices. Section III briefly discusses Eastern and Central 
Europe. Section IV illustrates how the normative and explanatory theories 
when combined enrich explanations and improve understanding.
I. NORMATIVE THEORIES
From the early nineteenth century until the 1970s, there was a sharp 
distinction between prevailing ideas about punishment in the United States 
and continental Europe. Americans were mostly consequentialists; members 
of the theory class would have described themselves as “utilitarians”, although 
in European terms “positivists” would have been more accurate1. Theories, 
institutions, policies, and practices in the English-speaking countries were 
importantly influenced by consequentialist ideas, most dramatically in the 
United States and significantly elsewhere. Continental European systems 
were principally retributivist. European opinion leaders were influenced by 
positivist ideas generally and rehabilitation in particular, from the time of 
Franz von Liszt onwards, but they were much more influential in relation to the 
youth justice systems than to adult systems. For adult offenders convicted of 
moderately serious or serious crimes, ideas associated with the Rechtstaat and 
the related principle of equality in treatment of citizens by the state, confined 
positivist and rehabilitative ideas to the margins (Pifferi 2010). The fully or 
largely indeterminate sentence, for example, was adopted nowhere in Europe 
and discretionary prison release systems had only limited scope in reducing 
times served. Since the 1920s, the primary influence has been on programming 
within prisons and in community sentences, and in relation to indeterminate 
sentences imposed as measures, not sanctions, for small numbers of offenders, 
1 Jeremy Bentham (1830/2011), the most influential popularizer of utilitarian punishment 
ideas, wrote mostly about deterrent aims. American systems were concerned with 
deterrence but gave primary emphasis to rehabilitation and incapacitation, as Enrico 
Ferri (1921), the most influential popularizer of positivist punishment ideas in Europe, 
would have done. 
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usually people believed to be especially dangerous. In principle, a “measure” 
is not a punishment for crime but an act of public protection. As a result, 
sanctions for crime — punishments — must be proportioned to the offender’s 
wrongdoing, but measures need not be (de Keijser 2011)2. Of course there were 
differences between countries and within countries over time, but the idea 
that the seriousness of the crime should be the primary basis of punishment 
or set the upper limits of punishment was influential and endured—as it has to 
this day.
In the United States, the academic and real worlds lined up nicely. 
Practitioners and policy makers may not have read Cesare Beccaria (1764), 
Jeremy Bentham (1830/2011), or Enrico Ferri (1921), or known who they 
were, but they were in broad agreement with them that the primary purpose 
of punishment is to minimize harms associated with crime and state responses 
to it. Most of the institutions that comprise contemporary criminal justice 
systems — prisons, training schools, reformatories, juvenile courts, probation, 
parole — were invented in the nineteenth century and premised on the pursuit 
of that purpose. So were individualised and indeterminate sentencing systems 
for dealing with adult offenders and the parens patrie rationale that underlies 
the juvenile court (e.g., Platt 1969; Rothman 1971; Mennel 1984). 
Near the end of that 150-year period, the Model Penal Code (1962) laid 
out a blueprint for the mother of all consequentialist punishment systems3. 
Offenses were defined broadly and were categorised only into misdemeanors 
and three levels of felonies. Precise delineation of the seriousness of crimes 
was considered unimportant and unnecessary. The only important question 
was whether the defendant was guilty. Once that was determined, the judge 
was given broad discretion to decide what sentence to impose. Probation 
was available for any offense, including murder. If the judge believed that the 
sentences authorised for a crime were too severe, he or she could sentence 
the offender as if he had been convicted of something less serious. If a 
prison sentence was ordered, the parole board decided when the prisoner 
2 Measures are not confined to dangerous offenders. In the Netherlands, measures include 
such things as forfeiture of assets obtained through criminal means and compulsory 
residential drug treatment for addicted offenders.
3 Tonry (2004) documents and discusses these provisions, and the way of thinking that 
underlay them in detail.
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was released. The prison authorities could award and withdraw time off 
for good behaviour. Consistent with the utilitarian principle of parsimony, 
presumptions were created to ensure that offenders were not punished 
more severely than was necessary: judges were directed not to send people 
to prison, and parole boards were directed to release inmates when they first 
became eligible, unless specified conditions existed to justify some other 
decision. Allusions to retributive ideas appear only three times, and faintly. 
Two were provisions indicating that non-incarcerative penalties should not be 
imposed, or inmates released on parole, if doing so would “unduly depreciate 
the seriousness of the offense.” The third was a provision that one of the 
overall objectives of the code was to ensure that disproportionately severe 
punishments were not imposed. In the specialized vocabulary of punishment 
philosophy, this is an avowal of “negative” retributivism: an offender may be 
punished in an amount proportioned to his blameworthiness (but not more), 
but need not be. This in contrast to “positive” retributivism, the contemporary 
view of Andrew von Hirsch (1976, 1994), Paul Robinson (1987, 2008), and 
many other contemporary writers, and the nineteenth century views of 
Immanuel Kant (1999) and George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1991), that 
offenders not only may be punished as much as they deserve, but must be.
Stop for a minute and think about that: Retributive ideas were almost 
absent from the most influential American criminal law document of the 
twentieth century. The code was developed under the aegis of the American 
Law Institute, then and now the most prestigious law reform organisation 
in the United States. Lawyers then could not, and now cannot, simply join. 
They must be nominated by current members and approved by a membership 
committee; admission is widely considered a great honour, the capstone of a 
successful career, and ostensibly limited to people of great accomplishment. 
The code was developed over a 13-year period by a group of influential 
practitioners, including judges, prison commissioners, prosecutors, parole 
board heads, and defense lawyers. Work was directed by Herbert Wechsler, 
the century’s leading American academic criminal law scholar. Draft versions 
of sections were successively considered — and provisionally and then finally 
approved  — at annual meetings of the American Law Institute. The voters 
were not primarily criminal lawyers or academics, but mostly commercial 
and business lawyers and federal and state judges. The Model Penal Code was 
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drafted and approved by people who were neither radicals nor woolly-headed 
intellectuals. They were the most establishmentarian lawyers midcentury 
America had to offer, together with a group of leading criminal justice 
practitioners, and they did not believe that retributivism and proportionality 
should be central considerations in sentencing.
In our time, in contrast, retributive ideas seem an inherent part of popular 
and academic thinking about crime and punishment, even if they have had 
little recent influence on policy except in the vindictive sense that policy 
makers have generally preferred harsher punishments to milder ones. Social 
and experimental psychologists instruct that human beings are hardwired 
to react punitively to crime (Darley 2010). Evolutionary psychologists 
explain that natural selection has favoured human beings with that hard 
wiring. Individuals with clear senses of right and wrong and a willingness to 
act on them, it is said, are better community members, fostering cohesion, 
increasing the odds of community survival, and perpetuating the gene pool 
that predisposed people to be retributive (Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones 
2007). Some influential philosophers of criminal law argue that those punitive 
intuitions justify retributive punishment theories (e.g., Moore 1993).
If retributive ideas and instincts are so common, how can it be that they 
had so little influence on the Model Penal Code? The answer is that right-
thinking people in the 1930s through the 1960s believed that retributivism 
was atavistic. Commonly held intuitions and widely shared beliefs can be 
morally or ethically wrong, as is demonstrated by conventional views in earlier 
times about racial inferiority, homosexuality, and gender roles. That is what 
our midcentury predecessors believed about retributive instincts. They were 
wrong, should be acknowledged to be wrong, and should be ignored. Herbert 
Wechsler, and his mentor Jerome Michael, observed that retribution may 
represent “the unstudied belief of most men” but concluded, “no legal provision 
can be justified merely because it calls for the punishment of the morally 
guilty by penalties proportioned to their guilt, or criticized merely because 
it fails to do so” (Michael and Wechsler 1940, pp. 7, 11). A few years earlier 
Jerome Michael and University of Chicago philosophy professor Mortimer 
Adler explained that there are two incompatible theories of punishment: the 
“punitive” (retributive) and the “non-punitive” (consequentialist) and that 
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“it can be shown that the punitive theory is a fallacious analysis and that the 
non-punitive theory is correct. . . . The infliction of pain is never justified 
merely on the ground that it visits retributive punishment upon the offender. 
Punitive retribution is never justifiable in itself ” (Michael and Adler 1933, 
pp. 341, 344). The conventional ways of thinking, the zeitgeist, the prevailing 
sensibilities, rejected retribution and favoured rehabilitation and, to a lesser 
extent, deterrence and incapacitation. Indeterminate sentencing reflected 
that thinking. In its most extreme forms, in California and Washington State, 
judges did not set prison sentences; they merely sent people to prison … for 
a term limited in length only by the maximum specified in the applicable 
statute. A parole board decided when they were released (Rothman 1971).
Sensibilities, however, were changing while the Code was being drafted. 
The American Law Institute’s timing in releasing the Code in 1962 could not 
have been worse. Harbingers of discontent with penal consequentialism had 
already begun to appear (e.g., Lewis [1949/2011]; Allen 1959) and recurred 
with increasing frequency (e.g., Burgess 1962; Allen 1964; Davis 1969). By 
the mid-1970s, dissatisfaction was widespread. Policy makers rejected many 
features of indeterminate sentencing and favoured new approaches based 
on retributive ideas. Individualised, indeterminate sentencing was out. 
Retributive, determinate sentencing was in (Messinger and Johnson 1978).
Whatever it was that changed policy makers’ and practitioners’ minds 
also influenced theorists. Consequentialism lost ground and influence. 
Retributivism came into vogue. In the 1950s, Norval Morris (1953), John 
Rawls (1955), and H. L. A. Hart (1959) attempted to reconcile general 
utilitarian rationales for punishment as an institution with the salience of 
retributive ideas in making decisions in individual cases. Herbert Morris 
(1966) and Jeffry Murphy (1973) offered benefits-and-burdens theories, 
which, a bit obscurely, argued that the gravamen of crime is obtaining unfair 
benefit from others’ law-abidingness and that punishment should balance 
things out. John Kleinig (1973), in the first book about punishment with 
“desert” in its title, assessed the relevance of desert considerations to the 
justification of punishment. Joel Feinberg (1970) and Jean Hampton (1984) 
argued for expressive theories and Herbert Morris (1981) and Antony Duff 
(1986) for communicative ones. Michael Moore (1993) offered an intuitionist 
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account of punishment. Among the criminal lawyers, Norval Morris (1974) 
elaborated his theory of limiting retributivism, Alan Dershowitz (1976) his 
of “fair and certain punishment,” and Andrew von Hirsch (1976) his of “just 
deserts.”
University of Chicago law professor Albert Alschuler bewilderedly 
described the sea change: “That I and many other academics adhered in 
large part to [a] reformative viewpoint only a decade or so ago seems almost 
incredible to most of us today” (Alschuler 1978, p. 552). By the early 1980s, it 
was not unreasonable to believe that a corner had been turned and that policy 
makers, practitioners, and theorists would long march to the beat of distant 
retributive drums.
That did not happen, except for a few years. In the late 1970s and the early 
1980s some legislatures’ enacted statutes meant to encourage proportionate 
sentences and abolished parole release in order to ensure that offenders 
served the proportionate sentences they received. Sentencing commissions 
adopted guidelines based on retributive premises. The rhetoric of deserved 
punishment and desert entered the political lexicon in the United States, and 
shortly thereafter in Australia, Canada, and England and Wales (Blumstein et 
al. 1983, chap. 1; von Hirsch, Knapp, and Tonry 1986).
In the world of policy-making, the retributive moment quickly passed. 
Except in lip service, proportionality largely disappeared as an important 
goal. Many of the sentencing laws enacted in the United States in the 1980s 
and 1990s, including mandatory minimum, three strikes, truth in sentencing, 
and life-without-possibility-of-parole laws (LWOPs), paid no heed to 
proportionality. Drug laws mandated sentences for street-level dealers longer 
than sentences typically received by people convicted of serious assaults, 
robberies, rapes, and many homicides. Three-strikes laws mandated lengthy 
and life sentences for repeat property and drug offenders. LWOP laws meant 
what they said and by 2008 more than 42,000 people had been sentenced 
to prison under them (Nellis and King 2009). If principled rationales were 
implied by developments such as these, the principles were consequentialist — 
deterrence by means of threats of harsh punishment, incapacitation by means 
of lengthy periods of confinement, and moral education by means of the 
messages severe punishments ostensibly convey about right and wrong.
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New, less overtly punitive initiatives also paid little heed to proportionality. 
Drug courts and other problem-solving courts targeting mentally ill offenders, 
domestic violence, and gun crimes began in the early 1990s. By 2010 they 
numbered in the thousands (Mitchell 2011). Drug courts are predicated on 
the beliefs that drug treatment can work, that drug dependence is causally 
related to offending, and that coerced treatment backed up by firm judicial 
monitoring can break drug dependence. Other problem-solving courts 
are based on parallel logic. Proponents of problem-solving courts regularly 
announce that they are influenced by ideas about therapeutic jurisprudence, 
a school of thought that urges incorporation of therapeutic ideas into legal 
doctrines and processes (Wexler 1995, 2008a, 2008b).
Other proportionality-defying approaches proliferated. Prison reentry 
programs predicated on risk prediction and rehabilitative programming 
proliferated. Throughout corrections systems, increased investments were 
made in cognitive-skills, drug-abuse, sexual offending, and other treatment 
programs. Throughout the world, including in the United States, thousands 
of new restorative justice programs were established. All of these initiatives 
shared the characteristics that their primary aims were forward looking — 
reduce re-offending or drug use, solve problems, restore relations among 
offenders, victims, and communities — and not much concerned to apportion 
punishment to culpability or blameworthiness (Tonry 2011a).
As the twenty-first century began, and still today, most American theorists 
subscribe to principled retributive ideas that had currency and influence in a 
former time. Many American punishment policies and practices both those 
that are exorbitantly severe and those that are enthusiastically individualised 
are inconsistent with those ideas.
II. DETERMINANTS OF PENAL POLICY
The explanations for why countries have particular penal policies and 
practices are general and particular. They are general in the sense that some 
structural features of government and society such as income inequality, 
trust, legitimacy, and consensual political systems seem to be associated with 
particular kinds of crime control policies and punishment practices. They 
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are particular in the sense that the details of national history and culture 
powerfully affect both those structural features and their effects. 
Because of the extraordinary 500 percent increase in American 
imprisonment after 1973, much of the literature has focused on the U.S. 
The United States is the only European or North American country that 
retains the death penalty. It has the world’s highest imprisonment rate, 
exceeding 750 per 100,000 residents, and regularly imposes LWOPs, the 
developed world’s harshest criminal punishments short of death. Unlike most 
European countries and Canada, it refuses to acknowledge the moral force of 
international human rights conventions and declarations, or to incorporate 
them into its laws. Fifty years ago, United States governments were world 
leaders in promoting human rights values, the imprisonment rate was stable 
and in line with those of other Western democracies, capital punishment was 
falling into disuse, and the U.S. Supreme Court was admired throughout the 
world for its extension of human rights protections to criminal suspects. 
Something went terribly wrong. In the simplest sense, we know what 
happened and why. Between 1975 and 1995, policymakers enacted a wide 
range of laws meant to make punishments severer. These included three-
strikes-and-you’re-out laws requiring minimum 25-year sentences; 10-, 20-, 
and 30-year minimum sentences for violent, firearms, and drug offenses; 
LWOPs; laws permitting or requiring prosecutions of tens of thousands of 
young people each year as adults; and laws extending the reach of capital 
punishment. During the same period, practitioners became more punitive 
and risk-averse: prosecutors charged and bargained more aggressively, judges 
sent more people to prison and for longer, parole boards released fewer 
prisoners, and later, returned parolees to prison more often (e.g., Blumstein 
and Beck 1999).
What we don’t know is why American policymakers, nearly alone among 
leaders of Western governments, chose to enact such harsh policies and 
laws, or why practitioners became so much tougher. Crime rates and trends 
are not the answer. Crime rate trends that were much the same throughout 
the Western world after 1970s — rises through the early 1990s and declines 
since (e.g., Tonry 2004; van Dijk, van Kesteren, and Smit 2007; Eisner 2008). 
Imprisonment rates and penal policies however have differed enormously. In 
the United States, crime rates have fallen steadily since 1991 and imprisonment 
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rates have risen every year, more than doubling since 1991 (Tonry 2004). In 
the rest of the developed world, there was no common pattern: increases in 
some, decreases in others, and stability in most. 
Nor is public opinion the answer. In the English-speaking countries at least, 
penal policies and imprisonment rates vary enormously but public opinion is 
much the same. Majorities of the public believe crime rates are rising when 
they are falling. Large majorities believe judges are too lenient, on the basis of 
mistaken beliefs about the severity of punishments. The sentences citizens say 
they believe are appropriate are typically less severe than the sentences judges 
actually impose. When citizens are asked whether they prefer more punitive 
policies or increased investment in rehabilitative programs, majorities usually 
prefer the latter (Roberts et al. 2002). 
Three sets of more complicated answers have been offered. The first, by 
David Garland (2001) attributes toughened penal policies in England and 
America to conditions of “late modernity.” These include increased insecurities 
associated with globalisation and rapid social change, increased vulnerability 
of privileged segments of the population to victimisation by crime, the limited 
capacities of governments to affect crime rates, and increasing population 
diversity that feeds a “criminology of the other.” The result is a proliferation of 
“expressive” policies meant more to show that government is doing something 
to reassure the public, and to aid politicians’ efforts to win re-election, than to 
reduce crime.
The insuperable difficulty for Garland’s analysis is that, if it is right, it should 
explain why all Western countries experienced steeply rising imprisonment 
rates and steadily harshening penal policies. All the “causal” developments 
he describes — increasing diversity, globalisation, and existential angst — 
happened everywhere. Imprisonment rates and policy trends, however, 
diverged dramatically. Crime rates rose steeply in most Western countries 
between 1970s and the early 1990s but only in a few did policymakers adopt 
policies intended to make punishments harsher or imprisonment rates higher. 
Imprisonment rates increased five- and six-fold in the United States and 
the Netherlands after 1973 and doubled in England and Spain after 1993.
Through most of that period, Japanese imprisonment rates fell. Finnish 
policymakers chose to make the country’s penal policies less harsh and to 
reduce its imprisonment rates. Canada, and most European countries — the 
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rest of Scandinavia, Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Austria — did not adopt 
harsh new broad-based policies and in diverse ways worked to keep their 
imprisonment rates stable. Only in a few Western countries — England, 
Portugal, Spain, New Zealand — and only after crime rates began to fall in the 
1990s did imprisonment rates rise significantly, but to levels at their peaks less 
than one-fourth the current American rate (Tonry 2004, chap. 5; Tonry 2007; 
Lappi-Seppälä 2008).
Michael Cavadino and James Dignan (2006) offer a second analytical 
framework. A three-part typology (technically four, but one contains only a 
single country, Japan) links imprisonment trends and penal policy differences 
with systems of political economy. Neo-liberal states (e.g., England, New 
Zealand, the United States) are said to have the harshest policies and social 
democratic corporatist states (e.g., Scandinavia) the mildest, with conservative 
corporatist states (e.g., Germany, France) falling in-between. 
This analysis made sense, sort of, early in the 21st century but in a larger 
picture it is not informative. There are at least three kinds of anomalies it can-
not explain. Firstly, even in 2006, some countries did not fit their categories. 
The Netherlands then had the highest imprisonment rate in Western Europe 
except for England and Wales, but was not counted as “neo-liberal” while Aus-
tralia, which had a rate only slightly higher than Germany’s, was. Secondly, 
countries excluded from the analysis defied the categories. Canada by all ac-
counts should be included among the English-speaking neo-liberals but its im-
prisonment rate has held steady around 100 per 100,000 population for a half 
century, so it should have been included among the conservative corporatists 
with France and Germany. Spain and Portugal, also excluded, have had among 
the highest imprisonment rates in Western Europe at various times since the 
mid-1990s and no one would classify them as neo-liberal (rates have since fall-
en substantially in Portugal). Third, the typology collapses in other periods. 
In 1970, for example, the Dutch imprisonment rate was the lowest among the 
developed countries and the U.S. rate was in the mainstream. The Finnish was 
the highest. That would have made the Finns neo-liberal, the Americans con-
servative corporatists, and the Dutch, quite properly, social democrats.
A third set of analysis attempts to explain penal policies in terms of 
such things as income inequality, citizens’ perceptions of the legitimacy of 
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governmental institutions, citizens’ trust in each other and in government, 
the strength of the welfare state, and the structure of government. All these 
things seem to matter. Moderate penal policies and low imprisonment rates 
are associated with low levels of income inequality, high levels of trust and 
legitimacy, strong welfare states, professionalised as opposed to politicised 
criminal justice systems, and consensual rather than conflictual political 
cultures (Downes and Hansen 2006; Lappi-Seppälä 2007, 2008; Tonry 2007; 
Di Tella and Dubra 2008).
Even that analysis, however, does not explain American developments. 
For each of those factors, the United States falls at the wrong end, the end 
associated with more punitive policies and practices. We need to understand 
why. 
The story of American penal policy since 1973 is thus not about 
globalisation, neo-liberalism, or conditions of late modernity any more 
than it is about rising crime rates or harsher public attitudes. The simplest 
explanation for why American penal policies are so harsh is that American 
voters elected candidates who said they would make them that harsh, and 
did. Politicians took advantage of recurring features of American political 
culture in order to win elections and wield power. That explanation, however, 
is too simple because it cannot explain why Americans believed that serious 
problems of crime and disorder are amenable to easy repressive solutions, and 
accordingly why they voted as they did. 
And that explanation can be found only in cultural and political values, 
which evolve over time and are shaped by history and experience. In the 
United States, four factors — a tradition of populist extremism, Protestant 
fundamentalism, governmental structure, and a history of racial conflict — go 
a long way to explaining why penal policies evolved as they did in the final 
quarter of the twentieth century (Tonry 2011c). However, they point to a need 
for yet another level of explanation. 
Why have the populist extremism and moralistic Protestant intolerance 
recurred again and again, and why has the influence of tortured race relations 
remained so powerful? Big ideas about American history, including the 
Puritanism and intolerance of the first settlers, ideals of individualism and 
libertarianism associated with the frontier, and the early slavery-based 
southern economy, no doubt need to be woven into the answers. 
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Research agendas in coming years should focus on this level of explanation. 
The questions in other countries are different, and better questions will enrich 
understanding of why countries respond to crimes and criminals in the 
different ways they do. In France, for example, why is it that French men and 
women have for centuries accepted the legitimacy of broadly based amnesties 
and pardons of offenders and prisoners? In Italy, a mass commutation in 
2006 reduced the prison population by 40 percent (and a smaller mass 
commutation occurred in 2008 under a conservative Berlusconi government), 
and there were no mass outcries. My instinct (and guess) is that similar policy 
decisions in the United States, England, or the Netherlands would provoke 
political firestorms. Similarly, something in the Scandinavian and German 
histories and cultures resulted in adoption of restrained penal policies for at 
least half a century. Explanations can be offered in terms provided above — 
consensus political systems, high levels of legitimacy and trust, and so on — 
but they beg the question. What is it about the (very different) histories of 
those countries that produce those characteristics?
III. THE SPECIAL CASE OF EASTERN 
AND CENTRAL EUROPE
As specialist literatures go, the body of work attempting to explain national 
differences in imprisonment rates is not large, but it has grown rapidly. To 
my knowledge, central and eastern European countries that were Warsaw 
Pact members of Soviet Socialist Republics have received comparatively little 
attention (except, notably, Krajewski 2010). This is striking because in the 
1970s and 1980s the Warsaw Pact nations and the Soviet republics had very 
high imprisonment rates in comparison with Western Europe. For many but 
not all, that pattern continues. As Krajewski observes, “Europe remains visibly 
split into two different ‘penal climates’” (2010, p. 7).
“Why,” Krajewski asks, “do high imprisonment rates persist in the region 
twenty years after the fall of the Berlin wall?” (2010, p. 3). In searching for 
an answer, he draws on Lappi-Seppälä (2008), who identifies five factors 
that appear to explain high imprisonment rates and harsh policies: high 
levels of income inequality, weak social welfare systems, low levels of trust in 
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government, low levels of government legitimacy in the eyes of citizens, and 
conflictual politics and policy processes. 
Krajewski notes that eastern and central European countries are 
characterized by high income inequality and weak social welfare systems, but 
devotes most of his attention to the other three factors. Political legitimacy, 
he argues, may be crucial. Most countries in the region were for long periods 
dominated by foreign powers. This diminished trust toward state authority 
of any kind: “This was especially conspicuous in the case of communist 
authorities which lacked political legitimacy among the vast majority of the 
population. This was probably one reason why communist crime control 
policies were so punitive; they were not necessarily rational, penological tools, 
but socio-technical instruments” (Krajewski 2010, p. 7).
Lappi-Seppälä showed that high levels of governmental legitimacy in the 
eyes of citizens are strongly associated with mild crime control policies and 
low imprisonment rates. One source of legitimacy of criminal justice systems 
is that judges and prosecutors are career civil servants who are well-insulated 
from the political pressures that in various ways influence American and 
British officials. While this is formally true in Eastern and Central Europe, 
Krajewski observes that it may be less true than it appears and that citizens’ 
memories of the communist period likely make them skeptical.
The criminal justice system was of special importance to the communist 
party governments. Political loyalty constituted a primary criterion 
for professional career development. This most directly affected public 
prosecutors. Judges were affected to a lesser extent (even at that time they 
nominally independent). The public prosecution system was (and often still 
is) organised according to Soviet principles, and constituted a rigid hierarchy 
in which lower-rank prosecutors had little autonomy. In such a situation 
prosecutors usually tried to avoid decisions that could bring them into conflict 
with their superiors. After 1989 there usually were not general purges of 
public prosecutors or judges. In consequence old habits remained, and despite 
the new environment, appeared to be transmitted to younger generations, 
although without any special ideological element (Krajewski 2010, pp. 8–9).
Comparative political scientists have long observed that governmental 
policies tend to be more liberal and humane in countries that have 
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consensual—as contrasted with conflictual—political systems (Lijphart 1999). 
Consensual political systems are usually characterised by more than two 
major political parties, coalition governments, proportional representation, 
and multi-seat electoral districts. Major policy decisions are based on broad 
consultation within the coalition government and outside it. Major decisions 
are seldom changed abruptly, even after new governments are elected. New 
coalitions are likely to contain parties from the old one, and parties newly 
in power often were involved in development of policies of the former 
government. Most western European political systems are more consensual 
than conflictual. 
Krajewski observes that most of the former communist states fit the form 
but not the substance of consensual political systems. There are generally more 
than two major political parties and proportional representation electoral 
systems, but that does not produce consensual policy-making processes as in 
most of Eastern and Central Europe: 
Countries in Central and Eastern Europe tend not to have orderly political 
climates as a consequence of lacking an established system of political parties. 
In principle, all have multiparty political systems which usually require 
formations of political coalitions to form governments. This should in theory 
create pressures for a consensus- oriented political system. 
But the opposite seems to be the case. Political systems in the region 
are permeated by intense conflicts. Conflict between post-communists and 
political parties which emerged from dissident and opposition movements is 
one of the most important. As a result, political compromise is not necessarily 
common. “This probably fosters a political dynamic closer to the conflict 
political culture model” (Krajewski 2010, p. 8).
“The ‘penal climate’ in central and eastern Europe,” Krajewski observes, 
“thus seems still, despite all the ‘European influences’ to which the region has 
been subject, to be shaped by its communist inheritance… In the area of crime 
control, the influence of this communist past, which was so profound in many 
other areas of political, economic, and social life in the region, is especially 
resistant to change” (2010, p. 10).
Imprisonment rates and patterns vary among the former socialist states. 
Some like those in Hungary and Poland have trended downward toward 
Western European levels (and Slovenia to sub-Scandinavian levels). Others, 
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such as in the Baltic countries, remain high and close to both former Soviet 
and contemporary Russian levels. Nonetheless, the former Soviet view of 
prisoners as class enemies and social enemies is likely for a good while yet to 
engender a fundamental lack of sympathy with the interests and experiences 
of prisoners.
IV. THE FUTURE
Cultural and political values are not serendipitous. They evolve over 
time and are shaped by history and experience. In the United States, three 
factors — the Evangelical Protestant fundamentalism, the conflictual political 
system, and the history of race relations — go a long way to explaining why 
penal policies evolved as they did in the final quarter of the twentieth century. 
In eastern and central Europe, the lingering effects of communist rule, in 
concert with longer-term features of the distinctive histories and traditional 
cultures of individual countries, are important backdrops to contemporary 
policies and practices. Different historical and cultural characteristics are 
likely to explain humane and moderate punishment policies and attitudes in 
the Scandinavian and German-speaking countries.
Normative ideas interact with government policies even if they do not fully 
explain them and even if they sometimes, as in the contemporary United States, 
seem largely incompatible. Two things seem clear. The traditional division of 
normative idea and theories into retributive and consequentialist categories 
is incomplete. The ideas encompassed in retributivism and consequentialism 
are ultimately concerned to explain and justify what happens to convicted 
offenders in terms that relate to them as individual human beings and that 
to some considerable extent take account of their interests and autonomy. 
In many countries at diverse times, however, punishment policies take little 
account of offenders’ interests. Prominent contemporary examples include 
the United States and to a lesser extent England and Wales, South Africa, the 
former socialist states of Eastern and Central Europe, and Russia.
What all those countries share is histories characterised by political 
cultures in which the interests of some people do or did not count — black 
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people in the United States and South Africa, class enemies in Russia and the 
other former socialist states, and the working class in England and Wales. The 
last example is the most tentatively offered; it is hard not to see the common 
characterizations of young working-class offenders by English politicians and 
newspapers as louts, yobs, and scum as signifying a social category of lower-
class people who have not accepted their inferior statuses and the need to 
behave themselves as their betters would wish. All of these social categories 
of people are the targets of laws, policies, and patterns of punishment that 
suggest they are seen primarily as social threats and not as people whose 
interests deserve the concern and respect that traditional retributive and 
consequentialist theories of punishment would give them.
The second influence is contingency. The adoption of indeterminate 
sentencing in the United States created institutions and conventions that were 
especially vulnerable to a radical change in prevailing ways of thinking about 
crime and criminals.
 These two considerations go a long way toward explaining why American 
punishment policies became so much more severe and imprisonment 
rates rose after the early 1970s. Before then, criminal justice policy was not 
highly politicised and imprisonment rates had been stable for a half century 
(Blumstein and Cohen 1973). After that, however, conservative Republicans 
for three decades pursued what became known as the “Republican Southern 
Strategy” of focusing their campaigns and strategies of governing on issues 
such as welfare fraud and “law and order” which everyone knew to be veiled 
appeals to racial resentments of white southern and working-class voters 
(Edsall and Edsall 1991; Tonry 1995; Gottschalk 2006).
During a time of rising crime rates, conservative politicians were in 
any case attracted to adoption of policies aimed at increasing the severity 
of punishment. Partly they sought to contrast their punitive approaches 
to the more social welfare-oriented and rehabilitative approaches of many 
Democrats. The Southern Strategy provided a more cynical additional logic 
for a political emphasis on law and order. Democrats eventually adopted a 
strategy associated with President Bill Clinton of “not letting the Republicans 
get to his right on crime.” After that, politicians in both parties competed to 
show who was tougher.
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Tough ideological anti-crime policies have so far been adopted in a few 
other countries. Examples include England and Wales during New Labour’s 
period of governance under Tony Blair, a handful of Australian states and 
Canadian provinces at various times, and in the past few years the Canadian 
national government of Conservative Party prime minister Stephen Harper. 
In all those places, a-normative punishment ideas, unconcerned about 
justice to or the interests of offenders took hold. The effects, however, have 
been much more pronounced in the United States. Partly this is because the 
period of dominance of a-normative ideas has lasted longer in the U.S. than 
elsewhere. Partly it is because of the history of American race relations. Partly, 
however, it is because of the historical contingency of enthusiastic adoption 
in the 1920s and afterwards of indeterminate sentencing and full-throated 
consequentialism. When these lost support in the 1970s, the apparatus of 
indeterminate sentencing—unlimited discretion for practitioners and a 
tradition of “bark-and-bite” sentencing in which sentences seemed much 
harsher than they really were—remained. A generation of policy-makers who 
were indifferent to the interests of offenders, and multiply motivated to be 
harsh, readily adopted the old nominal numbers. Prison sentences measured 
in terms of decades and lifetimes, and an imprisonment rate approaching 800 
per 100,000 population, are the results. 
Changing the American situation will not be easy because changes will be 
required both in ways of thinking and in the fundamental architecture of the 
American punishment system. For so long as a-normative thinking remains 
predominant, and routine imposition of decades-long prison sentences 
remains acceptable, not much is likely to change.
The situation in other parts of the world now characterized by a-normative 
thinking may be different. Russia, South Africa, and some Eastern European 
countries have reduced their imprisonment rates in the past 20 years, partly 
because elites believe that is a humane and civilized thing to do. The current 
coalition government of England and Wales is dismantling many of the worst 
features of its predecessors’ criminal justice policies. The durability of the 
current Conservative government of Canada remains to be seen. For all these 
places, the task of reinstituting more humane policies may be less daunting 
than in the United States because they lack the architecture and ways of 
thinking associated with indeterminate sentencing.
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